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During a forensic investigation of a computer system, the ability to retrieve 
volatile information can be of critical importance.  The contents of RAM could reveal 
malicious code running on the system that has been deleted from the hard drive or, better 
yet, that was never resident on the hard drive at all.  RAM can also provide the programs 
most recently run and files most recently opened in the system.  However, due to the 
nature of modern operating systems, these programs and files are not typically stored 
contiguously—which makes most retrieval efforts of files larger than one page size futile.  
To date, analysis of RAM images has been largely restricted to searching for ASCII 
string content, which typically only yields text information such as document fragments, 
passwords or scripts.   
This thesis explores the memory management structures in a SUSE Linux system 
(kernel version 2.6.13-15) to make sense out of the chaos in RAM and facilitate the 
retrieval of files/programs larger than one page size.  The analysis includes methods for 
incorporating swap space information for files that may not reside completely within 
physical memory.  
The results of this thesis will become the basis of later research efforts in RAM 
forensics.  This includes the creation of tools that will provide forensic analysts with a 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Computer-aided crime has been a significant problem for industry in recent years.  
The FBI estimated the financial losses related to computer incidents in the United States 
at 67.2 billion for the year 2005 [Ref. 10].  These incidents included (but were not limited 
to): viruses, worms, financial fraud, network intrusion, and the sabotage of data or 
networks.  Computer crime has also posed a threat to national security.  Credit card 
information stolen from compromised systems might have been used to fund terrorist 
activities [Ref. 11].  As criminals become more adept at breaking laws through the use of 
computers, law enforcement agents must hone their ability to investigate these types of 
cases.  Computer Forensics can be used to establish who committed the crime and to 
reconstruct how the crime was executed. 
One specific branch of forensics gaining momentum concerns itself with RAM 
analysis.  Traditionally, when a forensic investigation is performed on a computer of 
interest, one of the first things done is to gather any volatile information that can be 
gleamed from the victim system.  Sometimes this includes making a copy of the system’s 
RAM content, which is analyzed with simple searches for ASCII or Unicode string 
content because few tools exist and few people are trained to perform a more in-depth 
analysis of the memory dump [Ref. 1].   
Some of the key pieces of volatile information that a forensic analyst is looking 
for are the currently running processes of a system and the files most recently used.  An 
educated investigation of a RAM dump could yield this information.  Some might ask 
why it is a good idea to use such a technique if there are programs available (such as ps1) 
that will enumerate running processes.  The answer is that these programs can be 
subverted if the system they are running on is compromised with a loadable kernel 
module rootkit—a piece of malware that can manipulate the execution of system 




1 The program ps lists currently running processes in a Linux system. 
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malicious code directly into running processes such that no new process is visible to 
standard tools.  A forensic exploration of physical memory can look at kernel structures 
directly and, consequently see through any such deceptions.  
Recent worms, including SQL Slammer and Code Red, do not write any data to 
disk [Ref. 12].  All data remains in physical memory.  This renders standard disk 
forensics useless and becomes yet another reason why thoroughly inspecting RAM is a 
growing necessity.  It may be the only way to directly detect the presence of malware and 
give an investigator an opportunity to retrieve full and accurate information from a 
compromised system.  
A. RAM FORENSICS BACKGROUND 
The field of computer forensics is young.  The FBI created a Computer Analysis 
and Response team (CART) in 1984—which did not become fully functional until 
1991—to supplement its well-established investigation protocols for terrorism and 
violent crime [Ref. 2].  Since then, other public and private organizations have followed 
suit and now, twenty-one years later, forensics is beginning to take shape.   
Within the forensics community, a large share of attention has been paid to 
analyzing non-volatile media such as hard drives or storage peripherals.  More recently 
the rise of networks has created an interest in the study of network-based evidence as 
well.  Both of these subjects have existing, extensive bodies of knowledge—as 
exemplified by [Ref. 1] and [Ref. 7].  This is not the case for RAM analysis.  The 
analysis of volatile memory is such a young area, in fact, that one is hard pressed to find 
more than one paper directly addressing analysis of Linux RAM contents.  As an 
example of the lack of attention to this critical need, the popular book Incident Response 
& Computer Forensics [Ref. 1] devotes 7 lines of coverage to RAM analysis in a twenty-
two-page chapter devoted to live data collection from Unix systems. 
RAM analysis, like all other forensic endeavors, is concerned with the retrieval of 
information that can serve as evidence in criminal investigations.  More specifically, it is 
the attempt to use memory management structures in computers as maps to extract files 
and executables resident in a computer’s physical memory. These files/executables can 
be used to prove that a crime has transpired or to trace how it came to pass.  The 
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usefulness of this type of investigation lies in the fact that any information found in RAM 
is known to have been recently running on the victim system.  Additionally, volatile 
memory examination can stand up to conventional attempts at thwarting forensic 
efforts—such as function hooking [Ref. 3]—which is a way to attach a chosen function to 
the normal flow of control in a computer system.  For example, if a rootkit has hooked 
itself into the Linux kernel and is intercepting calls to ps, it can exclude whatever process 
it wants to hide from the returned list of processes. 
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The immediate purpose of this research is to discover what forensic techniques 
can be used effectively on the physical memory of a SUSE Linux system running the new 
2.6 kernel.  Some techniques for volatile memory forensics have been developed for the 
2.4 kernel [Ref. 3] but they have not yet been tested in the new version of the Linux 
kernel—in which some of the fundamental structures involved in memory management 
have been modified. 
The more general goal of this research is to improve the methods of analyzing 
RAM dumps.  Currently, the typical way to analyze physical memory on a computer is to 
run a string search on the entire memory image in the hopes of finding information such 
as passwords, the cleartext of a recently typed encrypted message, or the contents of a file 
[Ref. 1].  Unfortunately, during this type of search, valuable context information is lost.  
For example, it becomes impossible to determine whether recovered string fragments 
represent the contents of executable files, data files, or runtime program data.  This is an 
unsophisticated “stab in the dark” type of analysis that can only yield a small amount of 
useful information—an unfortunate result when the contents of physical memory are a 
rich source of forensic evidence.  As criminals become more adept at creating malware 
that can elude current methods of digital forensic investigation, forensics methods must 
evolve to meet the challenge.  When the author of a piece of malware decides to design it 
to reside exclusively in physical memory—and thereby evade any hard drive 
investigation—the forensic analyst must have a way to detect it.  The goal of this research 
is to provide the basis for the development of tools that the forensic analyst can use in a 
detailed analysis of Linux kernel 2.6 memory images. 
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C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This paper will present forensic techniques, including a few proof-of-concept Perl 
scripts, which will facilitate the development of a tool that will be able to extract files and 
executables stored in a computer’s physical memory.  Chapter II will detail the structures 
that are involved in Linux memory management and their relationship.  This chapter will 
also outline some of the essential calculations and concepts that play a part in the analysis 
of RAM images later in the paper.  Chapter III will discuss the current state of RAM 
forensics.  Chapter IV will provide a description of the analysis performed on a SUSE 
Linux system running the 2.6.13-15 kernel.   
The analysis consists of two parts.  The first is placing specific files in memory, 
imaging the memory, and seeing if the file in question can be retrieved.  The second is to 
see what other useful information can be extracted from the memory image using data 
from swap space.  The main thrust of Chapter IV is to verify whether forensic techniques 
developed for the 2.4 Kernel [Ref. 3] are applicable to the 2.6 Kernel and to see if any 
supplementary techniques can be discovered for this new Kernel.  Chapter V will 
summarize the results of this thesis and problems encountered along the way.  




This section describes all of the major components of the Linux virtual memory 
management system.  A short description of each component is provided—as are the 
locations of the corresponding definitions in the Linux source code.  The base directory 
location assumed throughout is /usr/src/Linux-2.6.13-15.  This was the default location 
created by the SUSE 10 distribution used in this thesis, which can be downloaded at the 
following url: http://en.opensuse.org/Welcome_to_openSUSE.org.  Please note that 
depending on the version of the Linux kernel used, the version number will vary. 
A. PARAMETERS OF INVESTIGATION 
The research conducted in this paper was performed on a SUSE 10 system 
running Linux kernel version 2.6.13-15.  The system resided in a Dell Dimension 4400 
computer with 512 MB of RAM and an Intel Pentium 4 running at 2.0 GHz.  All of the 
programming was done in Perl version 5.8.7—except for a small c program used to aid in 
the analysis of swap space.  The amount of RAM was deliberately chosen to ease the 
burden of translating from virtual to physical memory addresses by avoiding high 
memory (> 896 MB) translations.  Use of high memory would not allow for the simple 
memory conversion scheme outlined in section C of this chapter.  Additional tools used 
during the course of this research are as outlined below. 
1. Source Navigator 5.1.4  
This program was run on Mac OS X 10.4.3 through X11.  It was downloaded 
using DarwinPorts (http://darwinports.opendarwin.org/getdp).  Source Navigator is a 
source code analysis tool that provided a quick way to search through the sizable kernel 
code for items of interest. 
2. Gcalc 5.6.31 
This is a calculator included in SUSE 10.  It was used for converting decimal 
numbers to hexadecimal numbers and vice versa.  It was also used for arithmetic in both 
bases.  These calculations were useful when adding offsets to the beginning of a struct to 




3. DD (Part of Coreutils 5.3.0) 
This tool version was included in SUSE 10.  In the simplest of terms, it copies 
data from one place to another.  In the context of this thesis, it was used to create all the 
images of RAM and swap.  The full documentation for dd can be found at 
http://www.hmug.org/man/1/dd.php. 
4. GHex 2.8.1 
This hex editor is included in SUSE 10.  All the analysis of images created for 
this thesis was done using this tool.  Substantial image files, as large as 400 MB, slowed 
the program down while being opened, but GHex responded quickly after that initial step. 
5. Memory (Part of KDE 3.4.2 Level “b”) 
This tool is included in SUSE 10 as part of the KDE installation and can be run 
with the command “kcmshell memory” from a terminal window.  It was used as a way to 
assure that data was being written to the swap space in response to the large memory 
demands made by heap.c [Appendix A].   
6. Kate Editor 2.4.1 
This editor is included in SUSE 10.  It was used to write all of the code involved 
in this thesis.  A helpful feature of this editor was that it allows a user to open multiple 
files and navigate back and forth through them in a single window with a forward and 
back arrow like a web browser. 
B. MEMORY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES 
1. The Big Picture 
Linux implements virtual memory management through a series of C data 
structures that are interrelated as shown in Figure 1 [Ref. 4]. 









vm _area _struct vm_area _structvm_next



















Figure 1.   Overview of Memory Management Structures. (From Ref. 3) 
 
2. Task Struct 
The kernel creates a task_struct for every process running on a computer at any 
given time.  It is defined in /usr/src/linux-2.6.13-15/linux/sched.h and holds a wealth of 
information about the current state of each process [Ref. 3].  For the purposes of this 
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thesis, the relevant information contained in each task_struct are the following: a pointer 
to the mm_struct, the process id (pid) of the program, and the executable name.  The 
reader should note that kernel threads have NULL mm_struct pointers because they do 
not need this kernel structure to exist [Ref. 6].  The offsets of the elements used during 
this research—measured from the beginning of this struct—are shown in Table 1.  These 
offsets allow an investigator to find the location of the elements easily when viewing the 
struct in a hex dump.  A developer can also use these offsets to create a program that 
parses this struct. 
 
Data Type Element Offset 
struct mm_struct* mm 0x78 
pid_t pid 0x9C 
char[] comm (executable name) 0x1A4 
Table 1. Elements of task_struct 
 
3. MM Struct 
This structure describes a process’ address space and, as such, there is only one 
mm_struct per process.  In the case of userspace threads, one mm_struct is shared by all 
of them.  The pgd member of this struct holds a pointer to the page global directory of the 
process.  This is the pathway to all the pages owned by a process—even those that are in 
swap space.  The mm-struct also outlines the start and end addresses of memory sections 
such as code, data, and the heap.  It is defined in /usr/src/linux-2.6.13-15/linux/sched.h. 
The offsets of the elements used during this research—measured from the beginning of 
this struct—are shown in Table 2. 
 
Data Type Element Offset 
struct vm_area_struct* mmap 0x00 
pgd_t* pgd 0x20 
Table 2. Elements of mm_struct 
 
4. VM Area Struct 
A process typically only uses small portions of the memory allocated to it and, in 
order to reconcile this fact, the vm_area_struct is used.  It contains a start and end address 
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for the memory area it describes as well as the access permissions for that area.  An 
example of such a memory region is a read-only library loaded into the address space or 
the process heap [Ref. 6].  The vm_struct is defined in /usr/src/linux-2.6.13-
15/linux/mm.h. The offsets of the elements used during this research—measured from the 
beginning of this struct—are shown in Table 3. 
 
Data Type Element Offset 
struct mm_struct* vm_mm 0x00 
struct file* vm_file 0x4C 
struct vm_set (where i_mmap 
pointer from address_space 
points to) 
0x28 
Table 3. Elements of vm_area_struct 
 
5. File Struct 
If a memory region represents a file, then the vm_file field of the corresponding 
vm_area_struct will point to a file struct.  The file struct is outlined at /usr/src/linux-
2.6.13-15/linux/fs.h.  It contains information about the interaction between a process and 
an open file and is only in kernel memory while a process accesses the file in question 
[Ref. 4].  This struct includes a pointer to the file operations available to that particular 
process and a pointer to the filesystem containing the file.  Other interesting data that can 
be gleamed from this structure is the user’s UID and the file pointer [Ref. 4].  The offset 
of the element used during this research—measured from the beginning of the struct—is 
shown in Table 4. 
 
Data Types Element Offset 
struct dentry* f_dentry 0x08 
Table 4. Elements of File Struct 
 
6. Dentry Struct 
These structures are created by the Linux virtual file system for every directory 
used in memory [Ref. 4].  For instance, if a user looks up the file “document.txt” in the 
path /home/Ted, then three dentry objects will be created: one for / (root), one for home, 
and one for Ted.  The declaration of dentry structure can be found in /usr/src/linux-
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2.6.13-15/linux/dcache.h.  It holds information like the name of its related file.  A pointer 
to the name is held in the d_name element—which usually points to the d_iname element 
further down in the dentry struct if the name is short enough.  If the name is long enough, 
the d_name element will point to a location with sufficient space. The offsets of the 
elements used during this research—measured from the beginning of this struct—are 
shown in Table 5. 
 
Data Type Element Offset 
struct inode* d_inode 0x08 
unsigned char d_iname (name of assoc. file) 0x64 
Table 5. Elements of Dentry Struct 
 
7. Inode Struct 
All the information required by the filesystem to manipulate a file can be found in 
this structure [Ref. 4].  The inode definition can be found in /usr/src/linux-2.6.13-
15/linux/fs.h.  The information in this struct includes: the number of the inode, the uid of 
the file, the length of the file in bytes, the last access time, the last write time, and the last 
inode change time. The offsets of the elements used during this research—measured from 
the beginning of this struct—are shown in Table 6. 
 
Data Type Element Offset 
struct address_space* i_mapping 0x9C 
Table 6. Elements of Inode Struct 
 
8. Address Space Struct 
The address_space struct can be found at /usr/src/linux-2.6.13-15/linux/fs.h and is 
created by the kernel for every memory mapped file [Ref. 3].  Some of the information of 
interest here is a radix tree with links to all the pages belonging to this particular file 
(page_tree element) and the total number of pages owned by the file.  In Kernel 2.4 it 
used to hold doubly linked lists of clean, dirty, and locked pages.  However, none of these 
lists exist in kernel 2.6. The offsets of the elements used during this research—measured 
from the beginning of this struct—are shown in Table 7. 
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Data Type Element Offset 
struct inode* host  0x00 
struct radix_tree _root page_tree  0x04 
struct prio_tree_root i_mmap (pointer to 
vm_area_struct) 
0x14 
unsigned long nrpages (number of pages 
owned 
0x28 
Table 7. Elements of address_space Struct 
 
9. Page Struct 
This is the page descriptor structure that holds information relevant to individual 
pages of a file.  The information found here that is of most relevance for this thesis is the 
index element which holds the offset within the mapping of the file.  For instance, if it is 
the second page of a file, the index field will hold the number one (because the indices 
begin at 0).  In the 2.4 kernel, the virtual field held the virtual address of the page being 
described.  In kernel 2.6, this is an optional field that is only required when a computer 
has high memory—more than 896 MB of RAM—to hold the dynamically assigned 
virtual address. The offsets of the elements used during this research—measured from the 
beginning of this struct—are shown in Table 8. 
 
Data Types Element Offset 
struct address_space* mapping  0x10 
pgoff_t index (offset within mapping) 0x14 
Table 8. Elements of Page Struct 
 
10. Memory Map 
All page descriptors are part of the mem_map array, which is typically stored at 
address 0x1000000 [Ref. 6].  The size of each page descriptor on the system used in this 
paper is 0x20 bytes so, by beginning at 0x1000000 and incrementing by 0x20, it is 
possible to traverse the entirety of this array from one page descriptor to another. 
 
 
C. USEFUL CALCULATIONS 
1. Virtual to Physical Memory Conversion for Kernel Addresses 
All pointers encountered in the structures described above will contain virtual 
addresses and, since this paper examines physical memory dumps, these addresses must 
be converted to their physical equivalent.  For example, if an investigator examines the 
host element of the address_space object (which points to an inode), s/he must be able to 
derive the corresponding address in the memory dump to determine where to look.  This 
translation is accomplished by subtracting the constant PAGE_OFFSET—hex value 
0xC0000000 in x86 hardware—from the virtual address [Ref. 6].  This means that the 
kernel virtual address 0xC1234567 is, in reality, physical address 0x01234567.  The 
reason behind this conversion is that the virtual address space in the typical x86 machine 
is 4 GB and the topmost Gigabyte is assigned to the kernel [Ref. 6].  This upper Gigabyte 
begins at 0xC0000000.  So physical memory begins at virtual address 0xC0000000, 
which is equivalent to physical memory address 0x00000000.  This memory layout can 
be seen in Figure 2. 
 
Direct Mapping to Physical 
Addresses




Address 0 Address 232
 
Figure 2.   Mapping from Linear/Virtual Address Space to Physical Addresses 
 
2. Page Frame to Page Descriptor Conversion 
An investigator might want to find the page descriptor associated with a certain 
page frame.  For example, if the investigator searches physical memory and finds a page 
frame that matches the signature for a known computer worm, s/he will want to find any 
related page frames.  One way to do that is to find that page’s page descriptor, follow the 
mapping pointer to the corresponding address_space struct, and read all the pages that 
have page descriptors in the radix tree (see Chapter IV, Section B, Subsection 3).  The 




[(Page Frame Addr. >> PAGE_SHIFT) x Page Desc. Size] + mem_map start 
PAGE_SHIFT is typically 12 bits—the shift is equivalent to dividing by the size 
of a page frame (0x1000 bytes).  As discussed above, mem_map begins at 0x1000000 
and the size of a page descriptor in the system used for this paper is 0x20 bytes.  The 
page frame address is meant to be a physical address. 
3. Page Descriptor to Page Frame Conversion 
An investigator might also want to find the page frame associated with a certain 
page descriptor.  In the example in subsection 2 above, when the investigator wants to 
look at the page frames associated with the page descriptors found in the radix tree, s/he 
could use the following equation: 
[(Page Desc. Addr. – mem_map start) / Page Desc. Size] << PAGE_SHIFT 
As the inverse of the previous equation, the PAGE_SHIFT in this case is 
equivalent to multiplying by the size of a page frame.  The variables and constants for 
this equation are the same as the equation in subsection 2 above.  The page descriptor 
address is meant to be a physical address. 
D. PAGE TABLES 
The standard way for the Linux operating system to translate between virtual and 
physical addresses is to use paging.  Paging is a way to break down a virtual address into 
sections, each representing an offset into a table that is a part of a different level of 
indirection.  Earlier versions of the Linux kernel made three levels of indirection 
available—even though most systems only required two.  The third level was only used 
in conjunction with a special feature in the x86 architecture called Physical Address 
Extension that allows a system to address 64 GB of physical memory.  However, in order 
to provide compatibility with new 64-bit architectures, a need arose to accommodate a 
greater amount of memory.  Beginning in kernel 2.6.11 there are now four levels of 
indirection used in Linux systems: Page Global Directory (PGD), Page Upper Directory 
(PUD), Page Middle Directory (PMD), and Page Table Entry (PTE).  PGD’s are tables 
that point to PUD’s, which are tables that point to PMD’s, which are tables that point to 
PTE’s, which point to the final level of page tables, which point directly at page frames.  
This sequence is illustrated in Figure 3. 
For 32-bit systems without Physical Address Extension Linux sets the length of 
the upper and middle directory fields to zero.  Collapsing both of those page tables to one 
entry and keeping them in the chain of pointers maintains compatibility with 64-bit 
systems.  
 










Figure 3.   Page Table Function. (From Ref. 5) 
 
E. SWAP SPACE 
In order to expand the address space that is effectively usable by a process and to 
expand the amount of dynamic RAM, modern operating systems use the method known 
as swapping [Ref. 4].  Technically, swapping is the practice of transferring a whole 
process address space to disk, but modern operating systems only transfer portions of a 
process’ address space to backing storage when the amount of free physical memory 
becomes scarce.  In Linux systems this typically shows up in the form of a hard disk 
partition devoted to this task, but swap areas can be stored in files as well.  A Linux 
system can have as many as 32 swap areas as defined by the MAX_SWAPFILES 
constant [Ref. 6].  The system used in this paper makes use of the hard disk partition 
method. 
Only certain types of data are eligible to be placed in swap space.  They are as 
follows (Ref. 4): 
• Pages that belong to an anonymous memory region of a process.  In other 
words, a region of a process that does not map a file on disk. 
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• Modified pages belonging to a private memory mapping of a process.  
Private memory mapping is when a process associates a memory region to 
a portion of a file on disk or on a block device—the private part means 
that it only reads from this mapping; there is no writing.  The process can 
still modify these pages even if they are read only.  However, the modified 
pages cannot be written back to the disk or block device they belong to. 
• Pages belonging to an inter-process communication shared memory 
region. 
1. Swap Area Descriptor 
Every swap area is described by a swap_info_struct—which is defined in 
/usr/src/linux-2.6.13-15/linux/swap.h.  This structure contains a pointer to the swap area 
(either partition or file) and information including the size of the swap area, the number 
of usable pages, and a pointer to the swap map.  There is a statically declared array called 
swap_info that holds all of the existing swap_info_struct objects in a system. 
2. Swap Map 
The swap_map array is an array of counters representing page slots in the swap 
area.  There is an array element for every page slot in the corresponding swap area and 
the counter represents the number of processes using the page in that particular page slot.  
If the counter that represents a certain slot contains the number SWAP_MAP_BAD (32, 
768), then it is an indication that the slot is defective. 
3. How the Pieces Fit Together 
The following figure illustrates how all the pieces in the management of swap 
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F. IMAGING RAM IN LINUX 
The tool used to image physical memory and swap space throughout the course of 
this thesis was dd.  This is a simple and powerful command line tool included in Linux 
distributions that can be used to copy the standard input to the standard output [Ref. 15].  
To create an image of RAM, the directory /dev/mem was copied to a file.  This directory 
represents RAM and, as such, when it was copied, so were the contents of memory.  The 
actual command used looked like this: 
“dd if=/dev/mem of=whole_mem.img bs=1” 
The “if” operand defines an input file and the “of” operand defines an output file.  The 
output file for this particular run of dd is “whole_mem.img”.  The “bs” operand sets the 
block size to n bytes—in this case n is equal to one.   
Images of swap space were taken using a similar set up.  One of the differences is 
that the swap space, as it was set up for this thesis, was represented by the /dev/hda3—the 
third hard disk partition.  The other difference is the use of the “count” operand.  It 
specifies the number of input blocks to copy.  The actual command used looked like this: 
“dd if=/dev/hda3 of=swap_space2.img bs=1 count=245760000” 
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III. CURRENT STATE OF RAM FORENSICS 
Ram forensics is a blossoming field and, as such, has not yet reached maturity.  In 
fact, it can be safely said that this field is in its infancy stage.  Documents such as [Ref. 7] 
and [Ref. 8] describe the collection procedure for volatile memory in the most general of 
terms.  They both agree that an investigator handling an incident should begin by 
collecting volatile data, which includes physical memory.  Unfortunately, they don’t 
specify how an investigator should approach the analysis of a system’s memory.  A list in 
[Ref. 8] mentions some useful programs such as ps that can be used to extract volatile 
data from a system.  One incident response text [Ref. 1] only goes as far as mentioning 
that few people go further than running a string search of a memory image. 
The most recent of the documents referenced in the above paragraph is [Ref. 6] 
which was written in 2004.  In March of 2005, a man by the name of Mariusz Burdach 
released a paper [Ref. 3] providing a more in-depth look at the forensic analysis of 
physical memory of a Linux system.  Burdach later presented [Ref. 9] at Black Hat 
Federal in 2006—which was largely a re-telling of his previous paper with some 
additional information regarding Windows physical memory forensics.  He has 
developed tools based on the principles outlined in his works that are available at 
http://forensic.seccure.net.  The only problem at this time is that the focus has been on the 
Linux 2.4 kernel and, since this kernel was superseded by the next stable release version 
(2.6) in 2004, the focus needs to shift to the newer kernel.  The 2.6 kernel has changed 
aspects of its virtual memory management that must be explored to determine if the same 
techniques that worked on kernel 2.4 remain effective. 
One aspect of the slides he presented that was an improvement over the paper was 
Burdach’s explanation of the relationship between page table entries and swap space.  He 
explains that when a page is swapped out, its page table slot will be filled with a pointer 
to swap space.  He also mentions that the way to know that a page table entry is an index 
to a swapped out page is to check that the least-significant bit is cleared.  This is true, but 
it is not always the case.  Bit 0 (the least-significant bit) corresponds to the 
_PAGE_PRESENT flag so it would make sense to assume that if it is cleared, the page is 
not present in memory.  The missing piece of information is that bit 7 corresponds to the 
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_PAGE_PROTNONE flag.  When a memory region must be protected from user space 
processes this bit is set and bit 0 is cleared [Ref. 6].  This means that the page is present, 
just not accessible.  A programmer must keep this case in mind when determining if a 
page table entry contains a swap space index or not. 
On the Windows side, the latest demonstrations of physical memory forensics 
techniques can be found in the solutions to the 2005 Memory Analysis Challenge 
presented by the Digital Forensic Research Workshop website [Refs. 13, 14].  Some of 
the theory discussed by the two winning answers can be applied to a Linux investigation 
and some cannot.  The following paragraphs address the application of windows forensic 
theory to Linux. 
To begin with, both answers looked at all the processes listed in the doubly linked 
eprocess list to create a printout of all the processes running on the system.  This is 
equivalent to walking the task_struct list shown in Figures 1 and 6 to enumerate all 
running processes on a Linux system.  The files representing each process were recovered 
and compared to known versions of those programs to check their integrity.  In this way, 
a few suspicious processes were found.  Using the radix tree structure (Chapter IV, 
section B, subsection 3) to rebuild process files could allow an investigator to use this 
method in a Linux environment. 
The second response also went one step further in that it searched windows 
objects such as the handle tables—which contain references to their owning process—to 
make sure that there were no hidden processes.  This is because a technique known as 
Direct Kernel Object Manipulation could unlink a process from the eprocess list to avoid 
detection through a simple walk of that table.  An analogous technique in Linux to verify 
if a task_struct has been unlinked from the doubly linked list of task_structs could begin 
by enumerating all mm_structs.  An investigator could then see if, after checking the list 
of task_structs, there are any mm_structs that are not accounted for.  The difficulty here 
would be that there is no pointer from a mm_struct to its parent task_struct so the search 
for the corresponding task_struct would require a heuristic approach. 
Another technique discussed in the second answer to the challenge was the search 
of segment descriptor information through objects such as the Global Descriptor Table 
and the Local Descriptor Table.  Suspect entries in these tables could reveal the presence 
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of a kernel function hook.  This is a way to insert a function of choice between the kernel 
and user space processes to filter unwanted information flow to user processes.  It is a 
good way to hide processes and/or files from programs that would otherwise detect their 
presence.  These techniques work in a Windows environment because Windows uses 
segmentation.  However, since Linux does not use segmentation, gathering GDT or LDT 
data would be of no use to an investigator examining a Linux system. 
The final two methods used in the forensics challenge were checking MAC times 
and performing string searches for known malware strings.  The MAC times provided 
information about when a suspicious executable file was opened and, consequently, the 
probable time that the attack against the target system began.  The inode struct in a Linux 
system has this information available.  Finally, the string search would be possible in a 


























The next few sections go through specific examples of how to perform certain 
analysis methods on the physical memory of a Linux system.  However, this section 
offers the reader a blueprint of those methods so that s/he can better understand them 
when they are explained in detail. 
The first method allows an investigator to enumerate all of the processes present 
in physical memory.  This function is accomplished by traversing the doubly linked list 
of task_structs shown in Figures 1 and 6. The steps required are as follows:  
1. Find the address of init_task—the first element in the list—from the 
system’s symbol table. 
2. Go to that address and retrieve the desired information from the elements 
of the init_task struct—it is of type task_struct.  For example, the name of 
the process represented by the task struct can be found in the char array 
called comm at offset 0x1A4 from its first byte. 
3. Find the task element of init task because it contains the pointer to the next 
task_struct in the list and follow the pointer. 
4. Gather required information again—keep in mind that offsets are not from 
the beginning, but from the task element now (see next section). 
5. Follow these pointers and gather information until the pointers wrap 
around to init_task. 
The next method is rebuilding a file.  The next section provides a couple of ways 
to do this.  The first requires searching the mem_map array and gathering pages into bins 
according to their parent address_space struct.  This is not an efficient operation, but it 
can rebuild just about any file in physical memory.  The second method uses a radix tree 
structure found in the address_space struct to rebuild a file that represents a process.  In 
other words, if you run the program “prog”, then this method finds the file from which 
“prog” was run.  Here are the steps required for the second method (since the first was 
easily summarized above): 
1. Traverse pointers illustrated in Figure 1 from a task_struct down to it’s 
corresponding address_space struct. 
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2. Find the page_tree element of the address_space struct.  Then find its third 
member, which is a pointer to a root node.  Traverse the tree as shown in 
subsection 3 of the next section. 
3. Convert all the page descriptors found in the radix tree into page frame 
numbers. 
4. The page frame numbers are in order.  Copy them in order into the same 
file. 
Finally, swap space analysis is incorporated.  This is useful when the method 
described above does not work because certain pages belonging to the file were swapped 
out.  The necessary steps are: 
1. Follow mm pointer from task_struct to mm_struct. 
2. Follow pgd pointer in mm_struct to pgd. 
3. Each pointer in the pgd goes to a page table.  Follow these links to page 
tables and search the page tables until you find the group of pointers to the 
pages referenced by the radix tree—it is assumed that an analysis of the 
radix tree was already performed. 
4. Once those pages are found, look at the adjacent pointers in that particular 
page table.  If some of those addresses look like indices into swap space—
bits 0 and 7 are cleared—then look in the appropriate swap space page slot 
for the needed page. 
B. PHYSICAL MEMORY 
1. Traversing task_struct Linked List 
Figure 1 shows that the topmost virtual memory structure is the task_struct.  Since 
this is the most general structure, it is where the analysis of physical memory begins. The 
doubly linked list of task_structs can provide the names of every process currently 
running in a system just like the Linux ps command.  However, the advantage of this 
method over ps is the fact that it is immune to the manipulation of a rootkit because it 
does not rely on the target system’s kernel.  This list of task_structs is anchored by a 
special task_struct named init_task that can be found through the address listed in the 
kernel symbol table.  The symbol table contains the addresses of many important 
structures that the kernel needs to access and it resides in /boot/System.map-2.6.13-15.8-
default.  The reader should note that systems running other versions of the kernel would 
have different values than 2.6.13-15.8.  For example, System.map-2.6.11-default could be 
the symbol table name for a system running the 2.6.11 version of the kernel. 
Using the command “cat /boot/System.map-2.6.13-15.8-default | grep init_task”, 
provided a list that included the address of init_task.  This output can be seen in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Finding Address of init_task 
 
The address of init_task can be seen at the bottom of the list as 0xC034DB80.  
The command  
“dd if=/dev/mem of=task_struct.img bs=1 count=200 skip=3464064” 
outputs 200 bytes from the address at which init_task resides.  The value used in the skip 
parameter is merely the transformation of 0xc034DB80 to a physical address 0x34DB80 
and finally to a decimal number.  Any virtual address used in the context of a dd 
command must go through the same transformation.  Also, the value of 200 in the count 
parameter was chosen arbitrarily to cover enough of the task_struct to see its tasks 
element, ie, it is greater than or equal to sizeof(task_struct). 
The tasks element of a task_struct is of type list_head, which means that it is 
made up of a next and prev pointer.  The next pointer for the init_task structure was 
found 0x60 bytes from the beginning of the struct and contained the value 0xDFE01AA0.  
Dd was again used to carve memory from this address, after which it became apparent 
that the first word of data did not look like the beginning of a task_struct.  More 
specifically, it looked like an address (a pointer) instead of a typical number of type long 
because it was a value above 0xC0000000.  The reason why this value looked suspicious 
was that no typical number of type long was ever found to be above 0xC0000000 during 
the course of this research.  This incongruence was caused by the fact that the next and 
prev pointers in task elements of task_structs point to the task elements of the next and 
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previous task_structs in the doubly linked list.  In other words, the linked list goes from 
task element to task element, not from task element to the beginning of the next (or 
previous) task_struct.  The prev element of this task_struct pointed, as expected, to 
address 0xC034DBE0, which is the address of the task element of init_task. 
Repeating this exercise, I found that the prev element of the next task_struct in the 
list contained the address 0xDFE01AA0—the address of the second task_struct in the 
list.  The layout of the links can be seen in Figure 6.  Note that it is a doubly linked list 
so, at a certain point, it will wrap around and the next element of a task_struct will 
contain the address of the next element of init_task.  Likewise, the prev element of 











Figure 6.   Doubly Linked Task List 
 
Once the traversal of the task_struct list was mastered, a Perl script was developed 
to enumerate all tasks in a physical memory dump and output their executable name, pid, 
pointer to associated mm_struct, and the pointer to the next task_struct.  Appendix A 
contains the code for this script under the name find_task.pl. 
2. Rebuilding File 
A simple jpeg image of Waldo—the character from the “Where’s Waldo?” series 
of children’s books—served as a way to test the reconstruction of a file from information 
found in the mem_map array.  The test began by noting the first 8 bytes of each page to 
use as a signature that could be searched for in an image of physical memory.  Only four 
such signatures had to be written down because the length of the file was four pages.  
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Then, while having the waldo.jpeg file open in a file viewer, a RAM image was obtained 
utilizing dd.  The resulting memory image was opened in a hex editor so that the 
signatures could be used to find each page that made up the image.  The idea behind the 
signatures was to provide a way to recognize the pages in memory and work backwards 
to find their corresponding address_space struct.  A couple of false positives were easily 
filtered because they were not found at 4K boundaries where the beginnings of pages 
should be found.  Pages should be found at addresses that are multiples of 0x1000 (one 
page size).  For instance, a signature found at physical address 0x4935184 could not be 
one of the image’s pages.  The real one was actually found at physical address 
0x509C000. The rest of the search yielded the data presented in Table 1. 
 





Table 9. Pages Found in Image 
 
These physical addresses were turned into page descriptor addresses using the 
calculation covered in section C of the Background chapter.  Analyzing each descriptor’s 
index element—which is 0x14 bytes from the beginning of the page descriptor and refers 
to the page offset within the mapping—reaffirmed the fact that the pages were in correct 
order.  The page descriptor addresses corresponding to each page and their indices are 
outlined in Table 2. 
 
Page Number Page Descriptor Address Index 
1 0x10A1380 0 
2 0x10880A0 1 
3 0x117CF20 2 
4 0x10BA540 3 
Table 10. Page Descriptors and Indices 
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A piece of information proving that these pages were part of a cohesive section of 
memory representing an image was found in the mapping element of their page 
descriptors.  The mapping element was found at 0x10 bytes from the beginning of each 
page descriptor and contained the address to the same parent address_space struct.  All of 
these pages belonged to the address_space struct found at virtual address 0xC6D3E3B4 
(physical address 0x6D3E3B4).  A Perl script was developed to take in the virtual 
address of an address_space struct and print out all the pages, in order, that belong to it.  
Parsing all the pages in the mem_map array and seeing which ones have a mapping field 
that matches the input address is the method used to perform this task.  Appendix A 
contains the code for this script under the name find_waldo.pl.  
However, a typical forensic investigation would not begin with a search for a 
particular address_space object in memory because the investigator would not initially 
know what address_space struct to look for.  The ideal thing for an investigator to do 
would be to walk the whole mem_map array and group pages in bins according to the 
address_space that owns them.  Once this was done, the investigator would possess every 
file existing in memory—provided that none of that file’s pages were swapped out. 
To find the name of the waldo.jpeg file in memory it was necessary to follow the 
host pointer from the address_space struct to the related inode, and then the i_dentry 
pointer from the inode struct to the dentry struct.  The host pointer is the very first word 
in the inode struct.  In other words, it can be found at offset 0x0 from the beginning of the 
address_space struct.  The i_dentry pointer in the inode struct was at offset 0x18 and was 
found to point to the d_alias element of the dentry struct.  At a location 0x30 bytes ahead 
of d_alias, the d_iname element held the name of the image file: waldo.jpeg.  The 
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Figure 7.   Pointer Structure from address_space to dentry 
 
3. Radix Tree Structure 
While noting some of the differences between the address_space struct in kernel 
2.4 and kernel 2.6, a new addition was found: the radix tree.  This structure is rooted at 
the page_tree element of the address_space struct.  A radix tree is made up of a root, and 
a series of nodes.  The root element, defined in /usr/src/linux-2.6.13-15/linux/radix-tree.h, 
consists of the following: 
struct radix_tree_root { 
unsigned int    height; 
int    gfp_mask; 
struct radix_tree_node  *rnode; 
}; 





Struct radix_tree_node { 
Unsigned int  count; 
Void  *slots[RADIX_TREE_MAP_SIZE]; 
Unsigned long tags[RADIX_TREE_TAGS][RADIX_TREE_TAG_LONGS]; 
}; 
The traversal process for this structure, using the same memory image as in 
section 2, began with the address_space struct related to the Waldo.jpeg file at physical 
address 0x6D3E3B4.  The page_tree element was found 0x4 bytes into the address_space 
struct.  It had a height value of one and an rnode pointer with a value of 0xC531D034.  
Following this pointer to physical address 0x531D034 yielded a radix_tree_node with a 
count value of 4—which was followed by the virtual addresses of all four page 
descriptors associated with the Waldo file in correct ascending order.  It should be noted 
that the total number of pages owned by this particular address space was known to be 
four and that this number was derived from the nrpages element of the address_space 
struct at offset 0x30.  This traversal seemed to suggest that the height element of the 
radix_tree_root struct was responsible for the number of indirection steps needed.  In 
addition, it suggested that the count element of the radix_tree_node element outlines how 
many pointers must be followed.  This relationship is illustrated in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.   Radix Tree Structure 
 
An analysis of radix trees was later conducted with another address_space struct 
in the same memory image to confirm these conclusions.  The new address_space struct 
was located at physical address 0x1F064E44 and had a page_tree height value of two.  
The rnode link of the page_tree element pointed to the virtual address 0xDF0307C0.  
This node had links to 5 other nodes that, in turn, had links to numerous page descriptors.  
Since the height of the tree was two, there were two levels of indirection: one from the 
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primary nodes to secondary nodes and one from secondary nodes to page descriptors.  
The total number of pages was listed in the address_space struct as 287.  This coincided 
with the number of page descriptor links in the radix tree because the first four links from 
the primary node had pointers to 0x40 page descriptors while the fifth link from the 
primary node had pointers to 0x1F page descriptors.  Summing these yields 4 x 0x40 + 
0x1F = 0x11F = 28710.  This scheme is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.   Structure of Second Radix Tree Explored 
 
With this information, the general structure of radix trees was discovered.  The 
height value in a root node controls the levels of indirection and the count value in a node 
is equal to the number of addresses—either pointers to other nodes or to page 
descriptors—contained in the slots array. 
C. SWAP 
Section E of the Background chapter gave an overview of the reasons behind 
using swap space and the structures that comprise it.  In the following, a more in depth 
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discussion will provide a way to use this repository of data to complement the analysis of 
physical memory outlined in section A.  The idea is that if an investigator can analyze the 
page tables belonging to a process, s/he will be able to retrieve any pages that have been 
swapped out to swap space.  This is made possible by the fact that the kernel always 
leaves an index into swap space—actually the swap_map array—as a placeholder for a 
page frame that has been swapped.  The format of this index entry can be seen in Figure 
11. 
One of the experiments performed for this thesis involved using the C program 
heap.c (Appendix A).  This code was written to place 400MB worth of pages with 
predetermined signatures in the program’s heap space.  The idea was that such a large 
space requirement would force the kernel to put some of those heap pages in swap space.  
The 64 bit signatures were structured to provide a program’s pid and the page number.  A 
page would be filled with a repeating pattern of the signature so that the hex dumps of the 
pages would be meaningful and easy to recognize. The exact structure of the signatures is 
shown in Figure 10.  This program provided a foundation for the analysis that follows.  
 
3FC2 BEEF ABCD 0001
pid
Signature




Figure 10.   Signature Used in heap.c 
 
An image of both memory and swap space was taken using dd while heap.c ran.   
The count number for the swap image command—245760000—was calculated after 
noticing that around 19% of swap space (1 GB) was being used by heap.c.  The count 
number above is around 23% of swap space to be on the safe side.  It should be noted that 
page slots in swap space can be assumed to fill from the front of the available space 
because the kernel tries to store pages in contiguous slots to reduce disk seek time during 
swap space access [Ref. 4].  Using the Perl script find_task.pl (Appendix A) to enumerate 
all the processes from the image file yielded the address of heap.c executable’s 
task_struct.  The following table outlines the complete tracing of this process: 
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Table 11. Tracing of Heap Process 
 
Using the radix tree structure from the address_space struct to enumerate all pages 
belonging to this address space yielded only one page at physical address 0xBBA7000.  
This meant that any page table present in memory that was related to the heap process 
would have an entry with that address.  Since the last three hex digits of a page table 
entry are flags, the value to search RAM for was either 0x0BBA7*** or 0xCBBA7*** 
(the virtual equivalent)—where the asterisks represent wildcards.  This search was 
performed with the help of the find_pattern.pl script (Appendix A) using the following 
commands: 
perl find_pattern.pl 0bba7… (for physical address) 
perl find_pattern.pl cbba7… (for virtual address) 
The first search yielded 8 hits, while the second search yielded none.  This result 
suggested that the values in page tables represent physical rather than virtual addresses. 
An inspection of the mm_struct revealed that the pgd pointer contained the 
address 0xB338000. The value 0xBE55067 was found at offset 0x80 into the pgd.  It did 
not look like it was a virtual address, that is, it was not a number above PAGE_OFFSET 
(0xC0000000).  This meant that it was a physical address—which correlated with the 
results of the image search above.  Since the least significant bit of this number is set, the 
page is resident in memory and, therefore, the pointer could be followed to a page frame 
at 0xBE55000 because the last three hex digits are flag values.  The values 0xBBA7025 
and 0x1113C00 where found at offset 0x120 in this page frame.  The first of these values 
is equivalent to page frame 0xBBA7000, which was the same page frame found through 
the radix tree traversal above.  The correlation was strong enough to determine that the 
pgd actually pointed to a page table that contained page frames belonging to the heap 
process. The second value looked like a swap space index entry of type swap_entry_t, 
which is illustrated in Figure 11.  The entry had bit’s 0 and 7 cleared, so it was not in 
physical memory.  The offset into the swap_map array was 0x1113C. 
 
Index w /in swap _map Index w /in swap _info
Bits 31 -8 Bits 6-1
Bit 0 = PRESENT flag
Bit 7 = PROTNONE flag  
Figure 11.   swap_entry_t layout (After Ref. 6) 
 
Unfortunately, the image of swap space was not large enough to be able to include the 
index found above and, consequently, the swap page slot could not be confirmed to be a 
part of the heap process.  Nonetheless, it is very likely that this was the case. 
Another round of RAM and swap space images was then created to recreate the 
results found above.  The size of the swap space image specified in the count field of the 
dd command was increased to 429,496,673—roughly 40% of the entire swap space—to 
avoid another situation where the index into swap was beyond the bounds of the image.  
In the new image, following the heap executable links from task_struct to mm_struct to 
find the pgd pointer and, finally, to the page table yielded two addresses.  The first 
address corresponded to the page descriptor address found through the radix tree in the 
address_space struct.  The second page was, unfortunately, not a swap_entry_t value.  It 
was actually a match for the first half of the first page in the heap executable, which 
suggests that it was a page captured in transition during the imaging process.  This is the 
type of problem that arises from capturing an image from the same system that the 
imaging tool is running on.  Running the process at the highest priority level could have 
mitigated this type of problem.  Unfortunately, this change could not have completely 
stopped the process scheduler or, for that matter, the constant changes that the kernel 
makes to physical memory over time. 
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A further look into the pgd of the heap process revealed that there were 3 different 
areas of pointers.  The first was the single pointer that was traced in the previous 
paragraph.  The second and third areas held approximately 100 pointers each.  Following 
some of these links to the corresponding page tables proved that they were pointers to 
page frames filled with either ELF binary code—possibly libraries—or values allocated 
to the heap by the heap executable.  This suggests that the pgd is not a solid block of 
pointers and that any gaps are inconsequential.  The heap tracing in this new image can 
be seen in Table 12. 
 








Table 12. Second Heap Process Trace 
 
The integration of swap space data was made evident by tracing from the pgd to a 
page table that contained a mix of swap space indices and page frame addresses.  The 
page frame was at address 0xF00000 and two of its pointers had the values 0xF2C200 
and 0xF1C047.  The first value indicated that the page was not in memory because bits 0 
and 7 were not set.  This meant that 0xF2C200 was actually referring to the swap map 
index 0xF2C2 and, consequently, the page slot at swap address 0xF2C2000.  The second 
value had bit 0 set, so it was resident in physical memory.  These two pointers sat next to 
one another in the page table so they had to point to consecutive pages.  When the page 
values—from the heap.c signatures—were checked for both programs they were 
consecutive.  The page slot from swap space had a page value of 0xA2CF, while the page 
frame in physical memory had a page value of 0xA2D0.  A page missing in RAM was 



















The memory management changes in the new 2.6 Linux Kernel have not 
adversely affected the forensics techniques developed for the 2.4 kernel.  In fact, the 
introduction of the radix tree in the address_space struct made the enumeration of all the 
pages belonging to an address space much easier and more efficient.  The discovery of 
data belonging to a process inside swap space is possible—as shown in the previous 
chapter—and should add value to the full exploration of processes that reside in physical 
memory.  The techniques outlined in this paper, or programs based on them should now 
be integrated into any in-depth forensic analysis of a computer system.  
There is a new breed of malware based on the concept that physical memory is 
largely out of the hands of an examiner.  The effects of this insidious software can be 
mitigated by the application of the findings in this paper. However, unless these analysis 
techniques are properly automated, many investigators will shy away from performing 
detailed analysis of physical memory and potentially miss many pieces of evidence vital 
to such an investigation. 
B. PROBLEMS 
Throughout the course of the analysis, a few problems were encountered.  The 
first presented itself in the early stages of project development when the assumption was 
made that kernel space addresses had a range from 0xC0000000 to 0xCFFFFFFF—when 
it is actually from 0xC0000000 to 0xFFFFFFFF.  This made many of the pointers used in 
the linking of memory management structures seem invalid and caused confusion as to 
how these structures were linked. 
Another issue that consumed a great deal of time was related to the page tables 
belonging to a process.  Much of the integration of swap space data depended on finding 
page tables so that the swap indices could be used to find the missing page in swap space.  
However, the pgd contained addresses that did not look like virtual addresses and that 
were not in one solid block.  Previous addresses found in other structures had always 
been virtual kernel addresses (> 0xC0000000) and consecutive if they were part of a list 
of pointers.  These two factors contributed to the belief that the pgd pointer was either not 
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pointing to the correct location, or that the pgd was full of garbage.  It was not until the 
addresses in the pgd were taken at face value as physical addresses that the page table 
structure began to unfold. 
A third problem arose when the interconnection of memory management 
structures was being analyzed.  When there was a pointer from one structure to another, it 
was erroneously assumed that the pointer would always point to the beginning of that 
structure.  This created some situations in which the pointer from one structure did not 
seem to point to another.  An example of this fact is the doubly linked task_struct list. 
The links from one task_struct to another connect at the tasks element of one struct to the 
tasks element of another.  This element is at offset 0x60 from the beginning of a 
task_struct.  Looking at a task_struct at offset 0x60 and thinking it should look like the 
beginning of it would obviously lead someone to think it was not a task_struct. 
A final problem was inherent in the way that the experimentation for this thesis 
was carried out.  Due to budget and time constraints, the methodology used during the 
analysis of memory was completely software based.  This meant that, as images of RAM 
and swap space were being collected, memory was constantly changing.  The programs 
doing the imaging, heap.c, and typical kernel processes were constantly changing the 
landscape of memory over time.  The best option would have been to pursue a hardware 
based method for imaging physical memory that would minimize any software/kernel 
interference.  One such method would be to include a card in the systems PCI slot that 
could image memory at the flip of a switch [Ref. 12].  In lieu of imaging hardware, dd 
could have been satically linked and executed from a CD.  However, since there was no 
concern over the images’ validity in a court of law, it was deemed acceptable to run these 
commands from the target system.   
The only artifact of these issues that was ever encountered arose during the final 
analysis of the heap process in the previous chapter.  The first step in the tracing was to 
run the find_task.pl script to enumerate all the processes in ram and find the value of their 
corresponding task_struct.  When it was run, the heap process did not appear.  Further 
investigation revealed that if the links from the first task_struct—known as swapper— 
 
37 
were followed backwards, the heap process would be found.  The doubly linked list read 
differently if the links were followed in one direction than in another.  The list was 
caught at a moment of transition. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
The most obvious extension to the work in this paper would be to write a tool that 
could automate the techniques discussed.  This work would include the fine-tuning of the 
concepts presented here so that they can be translated into the specific language of a 
program.  Such a tool would be a powerful asset to an investigator because tracing hex 
dumps is not something that many investigators will want to do.  That is, the exploration 
of physical memory would often be skipped in the absence of a good tool to do automate 
it elegantly and efficiently.   
Another future focus of research would be to perform similar analyses on systems 
with different characteristics.  This could take the form of research on other operating 
systems such as Windows or Solaris.  It could also take the form of research on systems 
running on non-x86 platforms such as PowerPC or 64-bit systems.  Systems with more 
than 896MB of physical memory should be explored as well.  Unraveling the process of 
translating virtual addresses in ZONE_HIGHMEM to physical addresses and back would 
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APPENDIX.  SOURCE CODE 
This appendix includes all of the Perl scripts that were developed throughout the 
project to aid in the analysis of physical memory and swap space.  A small c program is 
also included, which was used to force swap space to contain a series of pages that I 
tagged to ease their retrieval in hex dump analysis. 
A. FIND_WALDO.PL 
#!/usr/local/bin/perl 
#This is a program that will take in the virtual address of 
#an address_struct object and output all the pages (in order) 







my $file;   #Image file to look into 
my $address;  #Address input from commandline 
my $user_in;  #User input 






#Get dump file from user 
$user_in = shift  
or die “User did not input anything.  Error found”; 
#Make sure that the input matches the correct format. 
#If -f is found, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-f”) 
{ 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
  
#If the value of input is in line with a flag 
#name or empty, then kill program 
if($user_in eq “-p” or $user_in eq “”) 
 { 
die “Name of file to be searched is invalid. Error found”; 
 } 
 
#Save string after -f in dump_file variable 
$file = $user_in; 
 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
 
#If a -p is found, then continue 




$address = shift; 
   
#If the address is empty then kill program 
if($address eq “”) 
  { 
die “There is no address specified.  Error found”; 
  } 
   
 } 
#Otherwise kill program 
else 
 { 
die “No pattern flag -a is specified. Error found”; 
 } 
} 
#Otherwise kill program 
else 
{ 






#Make sure that the input is 8 bytes.  I check 
#for 8 bytes because a pattern like 3a5d3876 looks 
#like 8 bytes on the surface, but as it is stored 
#in memory, it is really 4 bytes because it is in 
#hex and each digit only needs 4 bits to be 
#represented 
$length = length($address); 
 
#If it’s not correct length exit program 
($length == 8) or die “The address input should be 8 bytes, not 
$length. Found”; 
#If it is not a valid hex number, then exit program. 
#The period character is allowed as wildcard. 
($address =~ m/[(a-f|A-F|0-9|\.)]{8}/) or  
die “The input is not a valid hex number. Found”; 
#Change any hex letters to lowercase to prepare pattern 
#for later matches with data from memory that is read 
#in as lowercase 
$address =~ tr/[A-Z]/[a-z]/; 






#This program attempts to find a 4 byte pattern 
#from a file of choice.  Any hits will be stored 








my $length;   #This is the length of the input 
    #and later the file (in bytes) 
my $file;   #File to be searched 
my $read;   #Value read from file 
my $address = 0;  #Address where to read next value 
    #from 
my $pattern;    #4 byte pattern from commandline 
my $user_in;  #User input 





#Get dump file from user 
$user_in = shift  
or die “User did not input anything.  Error found”; 
#Make sure that the input matches the correct format. 
#If -f is found, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-f”) 
{ 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
  
#If the value of input is in line with a flag 
#name or empty, then kill program 
if($user_in eq “-p” or $user_in eq “”) 
 { 
die “Name of file to be searched is invalid.  Error found”; 
 } 
 
#Save string after -f in dump_file variable 
$file = $user_in; 
 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
 
#If a -p is found, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-p”) 
 { 
#Advance input 
$pattern = shift; 
   
 } 
#Otherwise kill program 
else 
 { 
die “No pattern flag (-p) is specified. Error found”; 
 } 
} 










#Make sure that the input is 8 bytes.  I check 
#for 8 bytes because a pattern like 3a5d3876 looks 
#like 8 bytes on the surface, but as it is stored 
#in memory, it is really 4 bytes because it is in 
#hex and each digit only needs 4 bits to be 
#represented 
$length = length($pattern); 
 
#If it’s not correct length exit program 
($length == 8) or die “The pattern input should be 8 bytes, not 
$length. Found”; 
#If it is not a valid hex number, then exit program. 
#The period character is allowed as wildcard. 
($pattern =~ m/[(a-f|A-F|0-9|\.)]{8}/) or  
die “The input is not a valid hex number. Found”; 
#Change any hex letters to lowercase to prepare pattern 
#for later matches with data from memory that is read 
#in as lowercase 
$pattern =~ tr/[A-Z]/[a-z]/; 
#Open file in question 
open(FILE, $file) or die “Memory image file could not be opened.  Error 
found “; 
print “Opened the file: $file \n”; 
#Find out the size of the file 
$length = -s $file; 
 
#Divide length by four to turn it from bytes to words 
#(4 bytes = word). This will control the # of times 
#memory will have to be read to traverse the whole 
#file 
$length = $length/4; 
 
for(my $i=0; $i<$length; $i++) 
{ 
#print “Length in hex: $length\n”; 
$read = Utils::read_val(*FILE, $address); 
if($read =~ m/$pattern/) 
 { 
print “MATCH PATTERN at Address: $address\n”; 
#Add to hit array 
push(@hits, $address); 
 } 
#print “READ: $read\n”; 
#Increment address by four bytes (a word) 
#It is interpreted as hex when the addition 
#happens and then turned into hex once again 
#in preparation for the read_val function. 
$address = hex($address) + 4; 




foreach $length (@hits) 
{ 
print “Address: $length\n”; 
} 
 
#Calculate length of the array to output 
$length = $#hits + 1; 
print “Number of hits found: $length\n”; 
 





#This is a program that will retrieve signatures from each page 
#of a file in a Suse 10 Linux machine.  The signatures will be  
#12 bytes long and be choosen from the middle of each page to  
#reduce conflicts that might arise from pages having similar  
#beginnings or ends. 
use strict; 





my @sigs;   #Signatures lifted from file to search 
my $sig;   #One of the signatures in @sigs 
my $out_file;   #Name of the file that will hold 
signatures 
my $user_in;   #User input 
my $in_file;   #Name of the file that signatures will be 





#Get dump file from user 
$user_in = shift  
or die “User did not input anything.  Error found”; 
#Make sure that the input matches the correct format. 
#If -f is found, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-i”) 
{ 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
  
#If the value of input is in line with a flag 
#name or empty, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-o” or $user_in eq “”) 
 { 
die “Input file name is invalid.  Error found”; 
 } 
 
#Save string after -i in dump_file variable 
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$in_file = $user_in; 
 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
 
#If a -o is found, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-o”) 
 { 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
   
#If the output file name is there, then 
#put input value in dir variable 
if($user_in ne “”) 
  { 
$out_file = $user_in; 
  } 
#Otherwise kill program 
else 
  { 
die “Output file name is missing. Error found”; 




die “The -o flag is missing. Error found”; 
 } 
} 
#Otherwise kill program 
else 
{ 






#Extract signatures from each page of a file 
@sigs = get_signatures($in_file); 
 
$sig = @sigs[$#sigs]; 
#The offset within the last page that the 
#signature was taken from 
print “Offset where signature in\nlast page of file comes from:   
$sig\n”; 
 
#Open the output file for writing 
open(OUT, “>$out_file”); 
 
foreach $sig (@sigs){ 
#print ”Page Sig: $sig\n”; 
#Write signature to file 
syswrite(OUT, $sig, 27); 
 
#Write newline char to file 




#Close the output file 
close(OUT); 
 
#This function retrieves a specified number of hex  





#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 my $bytes = shift;  #Number of bytes to read from file 
 my $handle = shift;  #File handle of file to be parsed 






 my $extracted_bytes = “; #extracte bytes from file 
 my $read_in;   #byte read in from file 






#Output number of bytes choosen by caller  
if($v==1){print “The number of bytes to read is: $bytes\n”;} 
#Read in $bytes number of bytes 
for(my $j=0; $j<$bytes; $j++) 
 { 
#Read in a byte 
sysread($handle, $read_in, 1); 
   
#Change signature into hex 
$read_in = sprintf “%02x”, ord($read_in); 
#Append byte to extracted_bytes 







#This function extracts signatures from each page of a file. 
#They are taken from the middle of each page (0x500 into the 
#page).  The last page is different, however, because it is  
#seldom full.  For that page the signature comes from the  









 my $input_file;     #The file that will be 
scanned 
 my @sig_array;     #Array of signatures 
 my $file_size;     #Size of the file 
 my $total_pages;    #Number of pages required by 
       #file 
 my $full_pages;     #Number of filled pages 
used 
       #by file 
 my $left_over;     #Number of bytes 
actually used 
       #in the last page of the file 
 my $index = 0x500;    #Index into the file 
 my $signature;     #Signature 
 my $i;      #Loop index 










#Open the file to be scanned 
open(SCANFILE, $input_file)  
or die “Signature file $input_file could not be opened. 
Error found”; 
#Get the size of the file to calculate how many pages 
#are required 
$file_size = -s $input_file; 
if($v==1){print “The file size is:   $file_size\n”;} 
#Find the number of bytes used in the last page of the file.  #First I 
divide file size by 4096 (page size) and then strip #decimal part 
(floor function).  $full_pages = floor($file_size / 4096); 
if($v==1){print “Full pages used:   $full_pages\n”;} 
#Now we subtract the file size by the number of bytes that 
#are required to fill the number of pages found above 
$left_over = $file_size - ($full_pages * 4096); 
if($v==1){print “The left over is:   $left_over\n”;} 
#Divide this number (which is in bytes) by 4096 and take 
#the ceiling function of that result to get the number 
#of pages the file takes up 
$total_pages = ceil($file_size / 4096); 
if($v==1){print “Pages required by file:   $total_pages\n”;} 
#Extract 12 byte signatures from all full pages 
for($i=0; $i<$full_pages; $i++) 
 { 
#print “INDEX: $index\n”; 
#Go to the correct index in the file 
seek(SCANFILE, $index, 0); 
  
#Read 12 bytes from the file 
$signature = read_bytes(12, *SCANFILE); 
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#Save page signature in array 
@sig_array[$i] = $signature; 
  
#Empty signature for the before the next  
#signature is read 
$signature = “; 
#Update the index 
$index = $index + 0x1000; 
 } 
  
#Figure out the last page index for extracting  
#the signature.  First step is to figure out 
#the base index of the last page 
$index = ($full_pages * 4096); 
  
#Print out the base index of the last page 
if($v==1){print “Base index of last page:  $index\n”;} 
#Now we add half the number of bytes used in the 
#last page (the floor function is used in case this 
#division has a decimal component) 
$index = $index + floor($left_over / 2); 
 
#Print out the index used for the last page in the file 
if($v==1){print “Last page index:   $index\n”;} 
#Go to the index calculated for the last page 
seek(SCANFILE, $index, 0); 
#Read the signature 
$signature = read_bytes(12, *SCANFILE); 
  
#Place it in the last array element 
@sig_array[$i] = $signature; 
  
#Change index value to be the index within a page 
#not index within a whole file.  The remainder 
#of the division of the index value by the size 
#of a page will yield this value. 
$index = $index % 4096;  
 
#Add the index used for the last page to the 
#last element of the signature array 
@sig_array[$i + 1] = $index; 
 
#Close file to be scanned 
close(SCANFILE); 
 






#This is a program that will look for pages in a file that match 
#the signatures in a signature file.  Both files are specified 
#by the user. 
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use strict; 





my @sigs;   #Array of signatures 
my $sig;   #A particular signature 
my $last_index;  #The index used in the signature of the 
#last 
    #page 
my $length;   #Length of sigs array 
my $v = 0;   #Verbose mode flag 
my $base;   #Base value where the search of consecutive 
#pages 
    #will begin. 
my $in_file;  #File that will be parsed for matching pages 
my $sig_file;  #File that holds a list of signatures to look 
#for 
my $file_size;  #Size of above file 





#Get dump file from user 
$user_in = shift  
or die “User did not input anything.  Error found”; 
#Make sure that the input matches the correct format. 
#If -f is found, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-f”) 
{ 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
  
#If the value of input is in line with a flag 
#name or empty, then kill program 
if($user_in eq “-m” or $user_in eq “”) 
 { 
die “Name of file to be parsed is invalid.  Error found”; 
 } 
 
#Save string after -f in dump_file variable 
$in_file = $user_in; 
 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
 
#If a -m is found, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-m”) 
 { 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
   
#If the output file name is there, then 
#put input value in dir variable 
if($user_in ne “”) 
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  { 
$sig_file = $user_in; 
  } 
#Otherwise kill program 
else 
  { 
die “Signature database file name is missing. Error 
found”; 




die “The -m flag is missing. Error found”; 
 } 
} 
#Otherwise kill program 
else 
{ 







#Extract signatures from each page of a file 
@sigs = get_sigs($sig_file); 
 
#Get length of array received from get_signatures 
$length = scalar @sigs; 
if($v==0){print “LENGTH OF ARRAY: $length\n”;} 
 
#Save the index where the last pages signature 
#was extracted 
$last_index = @sigs[$length -1];  
if($v==1){print “Last index: $last_index\n”;} 
 




foreach $sig (@sigs){ 
#print ”Page Sig: $sig\n”; 
} 
  
#Make base value zero 
$base = 0; 
 
#Open file to find matches in 
open(MATCH, $in_file); 
 
#Get the size of the input file to determine when 
#to stop looping through pages 
$file_size = -s $in_file; 
print “SIZE: $file_size\n”; 
 
#While the base address is smaller than the size  
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#of the file, try to match signatures 
while($base < $file_size) 
{ 
if($v==1){print “Base is $base\n”;} 
match_against_signatures($base, *MATCH, $last_index, @sigs); 
$base = $base + 4096; 
} 
 






#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 





 my $signature;  #An individual signature in $in_file 
 my @sigs;   #Signature array built from $in_file 






#Open the signature file 
open(FILE, $in_file); 
 
while($signature = <FILE>) 
 { 
#Take newline off of $signature 
chomp($signature); 
 
#Save signature in respective place in @sigs array 




#Close signature file 
close(FILE); 
 




#This function receives the address in an open file 
#where a page begins and attemps to match that page 




#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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 my $base_addr = shift;  #Address where page begins in file 
 my $handle = shift;  #File handle of file to be parsed 
      #(file should already be open) 
 my $last_page = shift;  #The index of where to look for the 
      #signature of the last page 






 my $sig_beg;   #signature read in from beginnig of 
      #page 
 my $sig_last;    #signature read in from the 
      #index in $last_page 






print “base: $base_addr\nhandle: $handle\n”; 
print “last: $last_page\nSignatures: @signatures\n”; 
 } 
 
#Go to the correct place in the file 
seek($handle, $base + 0x500, 0); 
 
#Get signature from beginning of the page 
$sig_beg = read_bytes(12, $handle);  
 
#Go to the correct place in the file 
seek($handle, $base + $last_page, 0); 
 
#Get the signature from the index $last_page 
#index to check if this page is the last page 
#in the file 
$sig_last = read_bytes(12, $handle); 
 
#Print out both signatures 
if($v==1){print “First sig: $sig_beg\nSecond sig: $sig_last\n”;} 
#See if any of the two signatures extracted from the 
#page match those in the signatures array 
for (my $i=0; $i <= $#signatures; $i++) 
 { 
if($signatures[$i] =~ m/($sig_beg|$sig_last)/) 
  { 
print “MATCH PAGE $i\n”; 




#This function retrieves a specified number of hex  






#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 my $bytes = shift;  #Number of bytes to read from file 
 my $handle = shift;  #File handle of file to be parsed 






 my $extracted_bytes = “; #extracte bytes from file 
 my $read_in;   #byte read in from file 






#Output number of bytes choosen by caller  
if($v==1){print “The number of bytes to read is: $bytes\n”;} 
#Read in $bytes number of bytes 
for(my $j=0; $j<$bytes; $j++) 
 { 
#Read in a byte 
sysread($handle, $read_in, 1); 
   
#Change signature into hex 
$read_in = sprintf “%02x”, ord($read_in); 
#Append byte to extracted_bytes 









#This is a program that will attempt to enumerate task names  
#and pids from a RAM dump in a SUSE 10 Linux machine.  It 
#will be able to follow the links forward or backwards depending 









my $dump_file;    #Input file being used (default 
value) 
my $user_in;    #User input 
my $input;    #The input from commands run below 
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my $address_command;   #Stores the command to get the 
address 
     #of init_task 
my $init_task;    #Address of init_task 
my @point;    #Array containing next and prev pointers 
my $dir = 0;    #Direction of the enumeration 0 is  
#following next pointers and 1 is following 
#prev pointers 







#Get dump file from user 
$user_in = shift  
or die “User did not input anything.  Error found”; 
#Make sure that the input matches the correct format. 
#If -f is found, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-f”) 
{ 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
  
#If the value of input is in line with a flag 
#name or empty, then kill program 
if($user_in eq “-d”  or $user_in eq “”) 
 { 
die “Image file name is invalid.  Error found”; 
 } 
 
#Save string after -f in dump_file variable 
$dump_file = $user_in; 
 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
 
#If a -d is found, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-d”) 
 { 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
   
#If the direction value is 0 or 1, then 
#put input value in dir variable 
if($user_in eq “0” or $user_in eq “1”) 
  { 
$dir = $user_in; 
  } 
#Otherwise kill program 
else 
  { 
die “Direction value is invalid. Error found”; 




#Otherwise kill program 
else 
{ 






#Open the image of memory that you want to analyze 
open(DUMP,$dump_file) or die “Memory image file could not be opened.  
Error found”; 
print “Opened the file: $dump_file \n”; 
#Use a filehandle and pipe to parse through the output of this command 
open(OUT, “ls /boot |”); 
#Go through every line of the output 
while(<OUT>) 
{ 
#If a line matches the system map pattern then save it into input 
if($_ =~ m/System.map*/){ 




#Take the newline out of the input variable 
chomp $input; 
 
print “Looking in \”$input\” for init_task address.\n”; 
#Now get the address of init_task using the System.map file 
$address_command = “cat /boot/$input | grep \”D init_task\””; 
#Save the output of the address command into init_address 
$init_task = ‘$address_command‘; 
#Take the newline out of the init_address variable 
chomp $init_task; 
 
#Extract the address from init_address 
$init_task =~ m/(([0-9]|[a-fA-F])*)\s/; 
$init_task = $1; 
 
#Turn init_address into a physical address (subract 0xC0000000) 
$init_task = hex($init_task) - 0xC0000000; 
#Add 0x60 to make it point to the tasks member of the task_struct 
#which is required by enumerate_task $init_task = $init_task + 0x60; 
#Initialize next_task to init_task 
@point[$dir] = $init_task; 
 
#Traverse the task_struct linked list and get information from 
#each one.  This “for” loop caps the number of processes at 250 
#in the case that the “if” statement below is never entered. 
for(my $i;$i<250;$i++) 
{ 
#Enumerate information from task_struct 
@point = enumerate_task(@point[$dir]); 
  
#Convert pointer to decimal for enumerate_task function 
@point[$dir] = hex(@point[$dir]); 
#If the next task address is equal to the first one in the 
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#list (the address of the tasks member of init_task) then 
#break the loop.  This is basically looking for the  
#wrap around of the linked list so that it can stop looping. 







#Close the output pipe 
close(OUT); 
 
#Close the image of memory that you analyzed 
close(DUMP); 
 
#This function goes to the offset specified in the input 
#(which should be in hex) and returns a word (4 bytes) at 
#that location. The file it searches should be open when 




#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 
my $handle = shift; 
my $contents = shift; 
 
#This intereprets the hex number as a decimal to use in seek 
$contents = hex($contents); 





#The reason behind splitting the input is that I needed to 
#rearrange the order of the bytes from the way they exist in 
#memory—which is backwards.  For example, the word AB123456 in 
#memory is really the hex number 563412AB. 
 my $input_byte_1;   #First byte of the input 
 my $input_byte_2;   #Second byte  of the input 
 my $input_byte_3;   #Third byte of the input 
 my $input_byte_4;   #Fourth byte of the input 
  
 my $hx;    #Hexidecimal version of the above  





#Go to the correct offset in image file and read selected bytes 
seek($handle, $contents, 0); 
sysread($handle, $input_byte_4, 1); 
sysread($handle, $input_byte_3, 1); 
sysread($handle, $input_byte_2, 1); 
sysread($handle, $input_byte_1, 1); 
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#Rearrange the bytes and assemble them into hex 
$hx = sprintf “%02x”, ord($input_byte_1); 
$hx = $hx.sprintf “%02x”, ord($input_byte_2); 
$hx = $hx.sprintf “%02x”, ord($input_byte_3); 
$hx = $hx.sprintf “%02x”, ord($input_byte_4); 
  




#This function arranges the output from read_val into ascii 




#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 
my $characters = shift; 





#Each letter in the name must be converted into ascii 
#individually and rearranged.  Thus the 16 variables for the 
#typical 16 character maximum in executable names in a 
#task_struct. They are arranged into 4 words that will be ordered 
#from 1 to 4.  Within the words, however, there needs to be a 
#reversal of the order.  This is due to the fact that strings are 











#Convert name to ascii in the correct order 
$characters =~ m/(........)(........)(........)(........)/; 
$word1 = ascii_ize_word($1); 
$word2 = ascii_ize_word($2); 
$word3 = ascii_ize_word($3); 
$word4 = ascii_ize_word($4); 
 
#Assemble all the words into the whole_name 
$whole_name = $word1.$word2.$word3.$word4; 
 
#Strip any non alphanumeric characters out 







#This function takes a word output from read_val and reverses the order 





#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 





#Each letter in the name must be converted into ascii 










#Convert name to ascii in the correct order 
$characters =~ m/(..)(..)(..)(..)/; 
$word_4 = hex($1); 
$word_3 = hex($2); 
$word_2 = hex($3); 
$word_1 = hex($4); 
  
#Change each letter to ascii 
$word_4 = chr($word_4); 
$word_3 = chr($word_3); 
$word_2 = chr($word_2); 
$word_1 = chr($word_1); 
 
#Construct name 






#This function receives the address of the tasks member of a  
#task struct and enumerates the name of the process, its pid,  
#the link to the next task struct, and the link to its associated 
#mm_struct.  It also outputs the first word that is retrieved from 
#the address pointed to by the pgd member of the mm_struct  
#associated with the task struct. The input should be a decimal  
#number. The handle of the dump file is global in this file so it can 




#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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my $init_address = shift; 
#Print address passed in to enumerate_task 





 my $next;    #Pointer to the next task struct 
 my $prev;    #Pointer to the prev task struct 
 my $pid;    #Pid of the task struct in question 
 my $part_name;   #Partial name before it’s assembled 
#below 
 my $name;    #Name of the process represented by 
#the 
      #task struct 
 my $mm;    #Pointer to mm_struct from 
#task_struct 
 my $pgd = ‘NULL POINTER’; #Content of the address pointed to 
#by pgd 
      #member of mm_struct 
 my @ret;    #array with next and prev addresses 





#Derive other addresses from init_address 
$next = $init_address; 
$prev = $init_address + 0x4;  
$mm = $init_address + 0x18; 
$pid = $init_address + 0x3C; 
$name = $init_address + 0x144; 
  
#Turn addresses into hex numbers (in preparation for read_val 
#function) 
$next = sprintf “%08x”, $next; 
$prev = sprintf ”%08x”, $prev; 
$mm = sprintf ”%08x”, $mm; 
$pid = sprintf “%08x”, $pid; 
$name = sprintf “%08x”, $name; 
  
#Read the values at all of these addresses 
$next = read_val(*DUMP, $next); 
$prev = read_val(*DUMP, $prev);  
$mm = read_val(*DUMP, $mm);  
$pid = read_val(*DUMP, $pid); 
 
#Convert mm to decimal in preparation for computation of pgd 
#address. 
$mm = hex($mm); 
if($mm != 0){ 
#Compute address of pgd (0x20 from beginning) and turn  
#it into a physical address (subtract 0xC0000000)  
$pgd = $mm + 0x20 - 0xC0000000; 
$pgd = sprintf “%08x”, $pgd; 
if($v==1){print “Address of pgd within mm_struct: $pgd\n”;} 
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#Read the address pointed to by pgd 
$pgd = read_val(*DUMP, $pgd); 
if($v==1){print “Value of pgd: $pgd\n”;}  
 
#Convert addres to physical address 
$pgd = hex($pgd) - 0xC0000000; 
 
#Convert the result to hex again for read_val function 
$pgd = sprintf “%08x”, $pgd; 
#Read the value stored at the address pointed to by pgd 
$pgd = read_val(*DUMP, $pgd); 




#Print out PID if verbose it turned on  
if($v==1){print “Extracted PID is: $pid\n”;} 
  
#For name we have to read 4 words because that is the maximum 
#length 
#of an executable name in a task_struct 
$part_name = read_val(*DUMP, $name); 
#Read three more times to complete the 16 bytes that must be read 
for(my $i=0;$i < 3;$i++) 
 { 
#Calculate the next address to look read in (4 bytes ahead) 
$name = hex($name) + 4; 
$name = sprintf “%08x”, $name; 
   
#Read in and append to existing partial name 
$part_name = $part_name.read_val(*DUMP, $name); 
 } 
  
#Put the contents of part_name into name 
$name = $part_name; 
  
#Convert name to ascii in the correct order 
$name = ascii_ize($name); 
 
#Turn next, prev and mm into physical addresses  
#(subract 0xC0000000) 
$next = hex($next) - 0xC0000000; 
$prev = hex($prev) - 0xC0000000; 
  
#If mm is not equal to zero, then convert to a physical address 
if($mm != 0){ 
$mm = $mm - 0xC0000000; 
 } 
 
#Convert variable next to a hex value again  
$next = sprintf “%08x”, $next; 
$prev = sprintf “%08x”, $prev; 
$mm = sprintf “%08x”, $mm; 
 
#Convert variable pid to a decimal number 
$pid = hex($pid); 
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#Print out all the information garnered from task_struct 
print “--------------------------------------------\n”; 
 print “Executable name is:             $name\n”; 
 print “The pid of the executable is:   $pid\n”; 
 print “The next task_struct is at:     $next\n”; 
print “The previous task_struct is at: $prev\n”; 
print “The associated mm_struct is at: $mm\n”; 
print “Value pointed to by pgd:        $pgd\n”; 
print “--------------------------------------------\n”; 
#Assemble the return array 
@ret[0] = $next; 








#This is a program that will enumerate all the different 







my @addresses;   #Array of addresses found in dump file 
my $addr_ref = \@addresses; #Pointer to the array of addresses 
my @clean_addrs;   #The version of addresses array without 
     #NULL entries or repitition 
my $addr;    #A single addr space address 
my $dump_file;   #Memory image file to be searched for 
my $out_file;   #File to send all addr space addresses to 
my $user_in;   #User input 
 
#------------------------------------------------------------------- 
#Read in arguments 
#------------------------------------------------------------------- 
#Get dump file from user 
$user_in = shift  
or die “User did not input anything.  Error found”; 
#Make sure that the input matches the correct format. 
#If -f is found, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-f”) 
{ 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
  
#If the value of input is in line with a flag 
#name or empty, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-o” or $user_in eq “”) 
 { 




#Save string after -i in dump_file variable 
$dump_file = $user_in; 
 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
 
#If a -o is found, then continue 
if($user_in eq “-o”) 
 { 
#Advance input 
$user_in = shift; 
   
#If the output file name is there, then 
#put input value in dir variable 
if($user_in ne “”) 
  { 
$out_file = $user_in; 
  } 
#Otherwise kill program 
else 
  { 
die “Output file name is missing. Error found”; 




die “The -o flag is missing. Error found”; 
 } 
} 
#Otherwise kill program 
else 
{ 






#Traverse al page descriptors and run enum_addr_space 
#on them all 
Utils::traverse_page_desc($dump_file, \&enum_addr_space, $addr_ref); 
print “Done with initial printing!\n”; 
#Remove zero elements and repeating elements from 
#addresses array 
@clean_addrs = clean_array(@addresses); 
 
#Open out file for writing 
open(FILE, “>$out_file”); 
 
#Output the clean_addrs array to an output file 
foreach $addr (@clean_addrs) 
{ 
#Write out to file 





#Close output file 
close(FILE); 
 
#This function takes in an array and returns a version 




#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 





 my @new_array;   #Cleaned up array 
 my $old_element;   #An element of the old array 
 my $new_element;   #An element of the new array 
 my $add_old = 1;   #Flag for adding/not adding an 
      #element to the new array 





#Add the element from old array to new array only if 
#it is not equal to zero or is already in the new array 
foreach $old_element (@old_array) 
{#print “old element: $old_element\n”; 
#If the element is not zero then check if 
#the element is in new array. 
if(!($old_element =~ m/00000000/)) 
{#print “not zero\n”; 
#Check if element is in new array 
foreach $new_element (@new_array) 
{#print “compare to : $new_element\n”; 
if($old_element =~ m/$new_element/) 
{#print “MATCH\n”; 
$add_old = 0; 
last; 
    } 
   }    
    
#If the old element did not appear in 
#new array, then add it 
if($add_old == 1)  
   { 
push(@new_array, $old_element); 
if($v == 1){print “Added: $old_element\n”;} 
   } 
    
#Reset flag 
$add_old = 1; 




#Return new array 




#This function enumerates all the different address_space objects 
#by searching all links from page descriptors and outputs them 




#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 my $base = shift;  #Base address of page descriptor 
 my $file = shift;  #Pointer to memory file 
 my $ref = shift;  #Pointer to array where results 
     #should be stored 




 my $offset = 0x10; #Offset where mapping (addr. Space 
#pointer) 
     #can be found; 
 my $location;  #Address get addr. space pointer from 






#Calculate the address to retrieve pointer from 
$location = $base + $offset; 
#Turn location into a hex number 
$location = sprintf “%08x”, $location; 
 
#Read pointer contents and save them to address variable 
$address = Utils::read_val($file, $location); 






package      Utils; 
use strict; 
 
#This function creates a formatted output outlining what address_space  




#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 




print “The following pages all have descriptors that point to the 
same\n”; 
print “address_space object.  This address is:\n\n”; 




#This function takes in the address of a particular Address_space 
#object and find all the page descriptors and pages associated with 






 my $index;    #The position of a page w/ respect 
      #to other pages of same address 
      #space 
 my $page_desc;   #Address of page descriptor 
 my $page_address;   #Page fram address 
 my @answers;   #Array of lines from an input file 
 my $in_file = ‘match.txt’; #Input file with page addresses and 
      #indices 
 my $dump_file;   #Memory dump file to look into 
 my $line;    #individual line in answers array 





$dump_file = shift; 






#Traverse the page descriptors and perform get_match_info  
#on each one 
traverse_page_desc($dump_file, \&get_match_info, $address); 




#Read in needed info into an array in the  
#order dictated by index value of file (1st
#element of each line. 
while(<FILE>) 
 { 
$_ =~ m/(.+)\s(.+)\s(.+)\n/; 
$index = $1; 
$page_desc = $2; 
$page_address = $3; 
   
#Store lines into answers array by their index 
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#Print out pages found in order 





#Close the file 
close(FILE); 
 
#Remove the input file because it is no longer needed 




#This function traverses the mem_map array and calls a function 
#provided by the caller (through a pointer) at every page encountered. 





#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 my $dump_file = @_[0];  #The name of the file to look in 
 my $function = @_[1];  #Pointer to function to perform as 
      #the mem_map array is traversed 
 my @arguments = @_[2..$#_]; #Array of arguments inteded for 
      #funct pointed to by the above 





 my $mem_map = 0x1000000; #The physical address marking the 
      #beginning of the mem_map page desc 
      #array 
 my $offset = 0x0;   #Offset for loop that controls 
      #traversing the mem_map page desc 
      #array 
 my $location;   #The current address being seen in 
      #the loop 
 my $upper_limit = 0x20000; #Controls number of times the 
      #traversal loop will run 





#Open the image of memory that you want to analyze 
open(DUMP,$dump_file)  
or die “Memory image file $dump_file could not be opened. 
Error found”; 
print “Opened the file: $dump_file \n”; 
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#Loop through page descriptor entries and apply passed function 
#The loop stops at 0x20000 which is the value I calculated for 
#the number of page descriptors needed to cover 512 MB of mem. 
for(my $i=0; $i<$upper_limit; $i++) 
 { 
if($v==1){print “The offset is: $offset\n”}; 
#Calculate the current page address in physical memory 
$location = $mem_map + $offset; 
#perform function passed with function pointer 
$function->($location, *DUMP, @arguments); 
#Offset grows with loop 
$offset = $offset + 0x20;  
 } 
  





#This function takes in the address of a page descriptor and an address 
#to match to.  If the address to match to is the same as the one held 
#in the address_space pointer in the page descriptor, then we have a 




#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 my $location = shift;  #The address of a page descriptor 
 my $file = shift;   #Pointer to file to look in 





 my $hex_out;   #Hexadecimal output from read_val  
      #function 
 my $page_desc;   #Address of the page descriptor 
 my $page_address;   #Address of page that corresponds  
      #to page descriptor 
 my $index;    #Index of the page in question 
 my $mem_map_element_size = 0x20; #Size of a page descriptor 
 my $index_offset = 0x14;  #Offset where index resides 
in page  
      #descriptor 
 my $mem_map = 0x1000000; #Physical address of mem_map 16MB 
 my $out_file = ‘match.txt’; #File to write matches to. 





#Change the whole address to upper case 
$add_space =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/; 
 
#Retrieve the value of the current page descriptor’s pointer 
#to the address_space struct that owns it.  The 0x10 is the  
67 
#offset into the page descriptor where the actual pointer is 
#found. 
$location = $location + 0x10; 
#Turn location into a hex number 
$location = sprintf “%08x”, $location; 
 
if($v==1){print “The value sent in to read_val: $location\n”}; 
#Retrieve address_space pointer from dump file 
$hex_out = read_val($file, $location); 
if($v==1){print “The value returned from the read_val function: 
$hex_out\n”}; 
#Change the output to all upper case for the comparison 
$hex_out =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/; 
#Compare the result to the address passed in in the parameter 
if($hex_out =~ m/$add_space/) 
 {  
#Calculate the actual page descriptor address and interpret it 
#as hex 
$page_desc = hex($location) - 0x10; 
$page_desc = sprintf « %08x », $page_desc; 
 
#Calculate the page address in memory from the page 
#descriptor address.  The equation is: 
#((page_desc_address - mem_map_address)/0x20) << PAGE_SHIFT  
$page_address = (hex($page_desc) - $mem_map); 
$page_address = $page_address/$mem_map_element_size; 
$page_address = $page_address << 12; 
$page_address = sprintf “%08x”, $page_address; 
#Retrieve the address where the index of the page is stored 
$location = (hex($page_desc) + $index_offset); 
$location = sprintf “%08x”,$location; 
#Read the index of the page in question 
$index = read_val($file, $location); 
 
#Open out file for appending 
open(FILE, “>>$out_file”); 
   
#Write out to file 
print FILE “$index $page_desc $page_address\n”; 
if($v==1){print “MATCH at 0x$location, PAGE_DESC at 
0x$page_desc, “;}  
if($v==1){print “PAGE at 0x$page_address, INDEX is 
$index\n”;} 







#This function goes to the offset specified in the input 
#(which should be in hex) and returns a word (4 bytes) at 
#that location. The file it searches should be open when 





my $handle = shift; 
#Read in arguments 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------- 
my $contents = shift; 
 
#This intereprets the hex number as a decimal to use in seek 
$contents = hex($contents); 
my $v=0; 





#The reason behind splitting the input is that I needed to 
#rearrange the order of the bytes from the way they exist in 
#memory—which is backwards.  For example, the word AB123456 in 
#memory is really the hex number 563412AB. 
 my $input_byte_1;   #First byte of the input 
 my $input_byte_2;   #Second byte  of the input 
 my $input_byte_3;   #Third byte of the input 
 my $input_byte_4;   #Fourth byte of the input 
  
 my $hx;    #Hexidecimal version of the above  





#Go to the correct offset in image file and read selected bytes 
seek($handle, $contents, 0); 
sysread($handle, $input_byte_4, 1); 
sysread($handle, $input_byte_3, 1); 
sysread($handle, $input_byte_2, 1); 
sysread($handle, $input_byte_1, 1); 
  
#Rearrange the bytes and assemble them into hex 
$hx = sprintf “%02x”, ord($input_byte_1); 
$hx = $hx.sprintf “%02x”, ord($input_byte_2); 
$hx = $hx.sprintf “%02x”, ord($input_byte_3); 
$hx = $hx.sprintf “%02x”, ord($input_byte_4); 
  







*by: Jorge Urrea 
*2/15/2006 
 * 
*This program asks for 400MB of heap space and then 
*proceeds to fill it with signatures of the form  
*pid|BEEF|ABCD|page#. This is done to allow for an  
*easy determination of what process wrote the page and 












 int pid;  //The pid of this process 
 int *mem;  //Pointer to heap allocated by malloc 
 int *mem2;  //Pointer that advances through heap 
 int cat;  //Variable to concatenate values in 
 int page_count = 0; //The page number being added to heap 
 int i;   //For loop iteration control 
 
//Get pid 
pid = getpid(); 
 
printf(“The pid of this process is: %d\n”, pid); 
//Allocate heap space 
mem = malloc(419430400); 
 
//Initialize mem2 to mem 
mem2 = mem; 
 
printf(“Mem 1 is: %d, Mem 2 is: %d\n”, mem, mem2); 
//Loop the placing of bytes in heap.  The number 
//of iterations will fill up the whole space  
//allocated. 
for(i=0; i<52428800; i++){ 
 
//Assemble word to put into heap 
cat = pid; 
cat = cat << 16; 
cat = cat | 0xBEEF; 
   
//Put it into the heap 
*mem2 = cat; 
 
//Advance mem2 4 bytes 
mem2 = mem2 + 1; 
 
//If the sequence has been repeated 512 times, then 
//increment the page count (512 x 8 bytes per loop = 
//4096).  The modulo operation is to account for 
//indexing at zero.  That is, if you want to change 
//a page every 4 iterations you actually want iterations  
//0-3 to be page 0, iterations 4-7 to be page 1, etc. 
if((i%512 == 511)){ 
page_count++; 
  } 
 
//Assemble second word to put in heap 
cat = 0xABCD; 
cat = cat << 16; 
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cat = cat | page_count; 
 
//Put it into the heap 
*mem2 = cat; 
   
//Advance mem2 4 bytes 
mem2 = mem2 + 1; 
 } 
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